Sheila Bair is no stranger to debates over what government policy makers should do to keep the economy and financial system on track, and how to get back on track when crises hit.
Twice named by Forbes Magazine as the second most powerful woman in the world, she is perhaps best known as Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from 2006 to 2011, when she steered the agency through the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.
She joins me as Kevin Warsh officially starts his four-year term as Chairman of the Federal Reserve to look at the challenges he faces on both the monetary and financial side of the central bank’s policy equation, including worries like private credit that continue to heat up.
The two have a special connection. She worked with Warsh not only in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks when she was at the Treasury Department and he worked at the White House. And again during the years when she was head of the FDIC, and he coincedentally was on the Fed’s Board of Governors during those exact same years.
Sheila gives Warsh a big thumps up. “He’s very smart. He’s very quick. He’s a very calm hand... always took his time to make decisions based on the information he had. So I, you know, I think it was a great choice.”
She quickly dispenses with the view that he will bow to whatever President Trump wants him to do on interest rates. “He is will be a good defender of Fed independence. He will do what he thinks is right. So I’m not worried one iota about him falling, under pressure.”
What will be his biggest policy challenge? “Inflation has been significantly above the 2% target. It has been persistent. It’s we know it’s not what wasn’t transitory. It’s been with us for a while now. And, it is frustrating. And that’s going to be his biggest challenge.”
One of the biggest debates at the Fed, in the markets, in academia, is whether or not to cut the Fed’s balance sheet, a step that is at the top of Warsh’s list. Sheila is on his side.
“That’s something he’s long talked about. I totally agree with him on that. I think was a terrible mistake," she says. “I think what the fed did during the pandemic, with the best of and buying mortgage securities, has really been the key driver of the housing inflation problems we’ve had.”
This former bank regulator has more concerns as she looks at what faces the Fed now. She is skeptical of efforts to reduce bank capital requirements.
”I’m not sure the case is made that all the the capital standards are too high... <some argue> We’ve got to get rid of the excess of capital to unleash all this new lending, which, by the way, would be inflationary, too.”
Sheila is critical of the rapid growth in private credit, highlighting the lack of regulation, transparency, and the risks associated with banks’ indirect exposure.
“So…lack of regulation, lack of opacity, riskiness of those credits, that questionable valuations of banks going to lend these funds,” she says. “There should be very, very steep capital requirements that go with them, but instead they’re very they’re very weak because theoretically they’re (the funds) over collateralized.
After she left the FDIC, Sheila wrote a best-selling book, “Bull by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and Wall Street from Itself,” her insider's account of the 2008 financial crisis, and her efforts to reform Wall Street while protecting ordinary citizens.
Her writing didn’t stop there. She has just released the ninth - ! - book in her Money Tales series for young children all the way up to young adults, the latest one being “How Not to Lose a Million Dollars.”
“The big thing I’m trying to get… across is… the way to build wealth is to not lose money,” Sheila says. “Because so many people, especially young people, they’re reaching for the stars. They want to get rich… Yeah, let’s go trade some stocks or invest in crypto or whatever. Gamble or worse.”
So dive in and hear more about why she is behind Kevin Warsh 100% to lead the Fed forward and take on some contentious issues that will test his ability to get the rest of the FOMC behind him. And hear more about her financial advice books for the entire family from the youngest kids to even their parents who often tell Sheila they learn from them too.
Inflation will be Warsh’s biggest challenge 00:02:28:01
…Inflation. Inflation has been significantly above the 2% target. It has been persistent. It’s we know it’s not what wasn’t transitory. It’s been with us for a while now. And, it is frustrating. And that’s going to be his biggest challenge. So I think the first thing though, he look, he’s going to have a million people writing free advice.
Must establish himself on the FOMC 00:02:50:01
Kevin. Here you go. Here’s something from me. But, you know, I think talking with the other board members, the other FOMC members taking their pulse, hearing their views, sharing, you know, directly on a personal level, his thoughts on this, trying to build a core of support among these decision makers because the Fed sure has a lot of power, but it’s not; he is not, all powerful. And the FOMC makes a decision on fed funds rates. The board decides on interest on reserve balances. But, they follow the FOMC. So, you know, he really, really needs to, to start cultivating alliances, with his, his own organization. So I would say that now that will probably inform, his views on what he wants to do next and what kind of support he will have to do it.
Concerned about inflation being high and the fed cutting rates 00:03:40:22
I in general, I just, I, you know, I’m very concerned about inflation. I do think lowering rates when you have supply constraints, even though they may be transitory, they may not, but while you still have them, it’s a bad idea to… lower interest rates because that will just create price pressures.
Balance sheet policy was a terrible mistake 00:04:00:18
If you increase demand at the same time, your supply is constrained, I think on the, on the idea of, shrinking the balance sheet. That’s something he’s long talked about. I totally agree with him on that. I think was a terrible mistake. And I think what the Fed did during the pandemic, with the best of intentions and buying mortgage securities, has really been the key driver of the housing inflation problems we’ve had.
Long and short rates soon to go their own ways 00:04:24:21
I hope he can get support, on the board to tackle that. If and when he starts doing that, I assume at some point he will start doing it. That will put upward pressure on long-term rates. Presumably. So if you want to lower, lower short-term rates while you’re doing that, they may, balance each other out a bit. That might give him some flexibility, to, to deal with the, lowering if you want us to lower short term rates to, to counter any inflationary effect with, trimming the, the balance sheet. So there’s a lot ahead of him that I do think the first thing he, he’s going to need, he needs to find out where his support is.
Bair on Powell: staying is a bad idea 00:05:05:01
I understand why Jay Powell wants to stay. I genuinely think it’s a really bad idea. For sure, to stay. And I certainly understand, given that this terrible investigation, politically motivated investigation is still hanging over his head. He doesn’t want to give up his leverage by leaving. But I do think that, well, that is a potential complicating factor. And I really hope he will be true to his word and support the future.
Inflation is the problem 00:05:54:06
One of the big reasons Democrats lost was the Democratic ticket loss was inflation. So, and we’ve got a problem now, you know, inflation was trending lower mainly because of energy cost. And that’s reversed because housing’s still a real problem. Health care other is a real problem. But energy is now a problem too because of what’s going on with the Strait of Hormuz. So I it’s against Mr. Trump’s own political interests to make inflation even worse with the with the premature interest rate cuts. So I hope people understand that. I think Mr. Bessent, Secretary Bessent understands that. And, I certainly would assume that Kevin understands that, but he’s his own person.
Warsh will be his own man 00:06:42:22
I can’t <accept> this idea that he’s going to be some kind of tool. I mean, if he is committed to the Fed, he was on the Fed board for five years, as you mentioned, he will be a good defender of Fed independence. He will do what he thinks is right. So I’m not worried one iota about him falling, under pressure.
With Trump-always a worry 00:07:04:02
I do worry if Mr. Trump gets unhappy that he’ll go after him too, that I don’t want to happen. And I really hope the Supreme Court will decide the Lisa Cooke case soon. As you know, he tried to fire Lisa Cook and that’s a, pending before the Supreme Court. Now, if the Supreme Court sets a upholds the Fed’s independence, says you cannot fire except for cause, which is clearly in the statute and that there’s a very, very high bar for a for cause termination, then I think this puts, things to rest and will give all the Fed members, including the chair, a little more breathing room of flexibility.
Warsh will be a good leader 00:08:04:00
Yeah. Well, he he’s a very, he’s very smart. He’s very quick. He’s a very calm hand. we worked together during the 911 attacks. And then with the Enron bankruptcy too, which had been was quite disruptive for a time. So, you know, he’s a very calm, cool head. He’s a good, good leader. I always enjoyed working with him. I never, says that he was, He was he never got short tempered. He was never, You know, frenzied about anything. He was always calm. Took his time to make decisions based on the information he had. So I, you know, I think it was a great choice.
The Trump taint 00:08:44:06
It’s saddens me that he’s kind of got this taint because Mr. Trump has tried so hard to put pressure on the Fed and and, you know, face it, you know, anybody who thinks you’re so polarized now, anybody who is nominated or and, and appointed by Mr. Trump is a suspect by the opposition because, you know, just but the fact that you’ve been appointed by Trump and I think that’s unfortunate because there are a lot of good people and this administration, gosh knows I have my disagreements.
Glad Kevin was selected 00:09:10:19
I did support him. But, you know, I’m a Republican and, I know a lot of the people who are in his administration and they’re mainstream, solid people. And I was just very pleased Mr. Trump picked Kevin to be his successor.
No talk vs talk-talk: is there any difference? 00:09:52:01
… I remember the Alan Greenspan days where he basically, you know, nobody got any information. And that was not a good model either. But I can honestly say I’m not sure it worked any worse than what we’ve got now, because I do think there’s too many there’s too many press conferences.
Talking brings its own dangers 00:10:10:20
We don’t need eight a year. I mean, really and, you know, Alan Greenspan and Paul Volcker went through a lot of crises, a lot of problems without, without a plot, without an FOMC press conference. You know, you can’t run the Fed with all of that without all of that communication. And I do feel that because everybody’s out there kind of talking all the time, sometimes you can get, you know, conflicting signals and, but then sometimes you also get kind of these scripted, party line, talking points.
Can ‘less’ be ‘More?’ 00:10:40:14
Because at the last FOMC meeting, they said this and the projections were that and they kind of locked into that even when, you know, current data, more real time data would suggest a different course. So I think it deserves a rethink whether is fewer meetings, fewer press conferences, less forward guidance. I do think it would be healthy.
Powell and the Fed ‘pre-meeting deals’ Not the best. 00:10:59:21
I my sense is and I don’t know, I’m not in internally at the workings of the Fed. But I’ve been told by people who I think know that, you know, Mr. Powell’s approach has kind of been to talk with governors individually and then kind of get everything squared away before you get into the meeting. And I’m not sure that’s a good way to do it. I think having everybody in the room where they can freely debate and openly express views, even those that might disagree with the chair, I think that’s healthy for other governors. And if we’re missing members to hear those, those there’s disagreements. So I think and again, I don’t speak for him, but I think that’s what he’s talking about by fostering more, and better and more robust debate. And I think better decision making will come out of that than kind of this pre, you know, arranged one, one on one discussions that.
Freedom to disagree then solidarity 00:12:33:12
Yeah, this is what we’re going to do. Yeah. Now that makes some sense. And you know, with that, I mean, giving, governors and FOMC members the freedom to do that, comes with some responsibility on their part to, to speak their piece and make their case. But when it comes to make decisions kind of close ranks and move ahead, I, I do believe that at that point, after you’ve had that robust debate, it’s good to close ranks and and try to move ahead with unified front. Are there others who say, you know, they think they’re sending votes or healthy thing to? I don’t think distance by themselves are necessarily healthy. I think if, you know, but people need to vote their conscience and being feel free to do that. But yeah, I think that makes a total amount of sense. And I hope they try it.
Capital standards and lending 00:13:43:18
…If it made it all the capital standards too high… I keep hearing this. Oh, they’re <Banks> holding all this excessive capital. We’ve got to get rid of the excess of capital to unleash all this new lending, which, by the way, would be inflationary, too. Everybody focuses on interest rates.
Got inflation? Deregulation? 00:14:01:17
You’re worried about inflation. Well, how about deregulation. That can have an inflationary impact as well. So I that’s a bit of a frustration. But no, I mean they’re they’ve already significant, you know, with the stress tests and the leverage ratio, which they really especially for insured banks whopping decreases 20% decreases and inventive on capital requirements. So overlay on top of this what they’re doing with risk-based standards. Now you’re talking I’ve seen <huge> estimates. You know capital reductions in minimum capital. And that could get even bigger because they’re putting more reliance on risk-based standards which are subject to bit of manipulation. They call it optimization. They don’t say it can be difficult. But, you know, by adjusting your balance sheet, your asset exposures, you can change what your capital requirements are.
No constraining capital impact on lending 00:14:50:22
And they’ve got a lot more latitude to do that. Now with the reductions in the in the leverage ratios. So no, I mean we’ve got a lot of uncertainty. First of all, I don’t there’s no evidence the capital requirements are too high and constraining lending if anything there’s too much credit out there. I mean we’ve got, you know, a lot of, you know, great loans just sloshing around the system.
Lots of risks in the system 00:15:10:20
So there’s that and, the uncertainties with the war, geopolitical risks, maybe recession. I don’t think we can count that out. Stagflation, which frankly, I think is a bigger issue, because I do think if we go into a downturn and interest rates have to stay high, if interest rates go up because of inflation, if interest rates go up while credit losses are going down, they’re going to have both market losses as well as credit losses. And that’s not built into the stress test. And I don’t think banks are prepared for it. So you simplify all you like I would I would raise capital against private credit exposures frankly. But you know you can simplify without decreasing capital. And that’s what they should be doing. I think there is if your case for simplification and some of the things they proposed, I publicly said I agree with.
Fed ignores stability implications of easy money 00:16:26:10
Yeah. Well, that’s the argument. That’s absolutely the argument. And I don’t, you know, supervisory information they could get from the other bank regulators. They don’t need to do it themselves. And frankly, they don’t really pay attention to it. I’ve been there is well they don’t I mean, you know, the Fed has persistently refused to acknowledge financial instability, implications of accommodative monetary policy. You lower interest rates, you inflate asset values, you and you build up leverage in the system. And that comes with risk. And if you’re going to be doing that, if anything, you should be typing your regulatory standards, not weakening them or loosening them up at the same time. So no, I think that the fed is just too it really is.
SVB: Regrettably obvious 00:17:08:22
And you saw that was Silicon Valley. Oh my gosh. Everybody knew was the interest they had to jack up the interest rates because inflation turned out not to be transitory. This is going to cause, losses on securities that were held on, on, on lower yielding securities that were held on banks balance sheets. And that’s what happened with Silicon Valley.
How was this missed? 00:17:29:13
And they were totally flat footed. And they should have figured out, I mean, everybody wait. They should know way earlier that interest rates were going to go up, notwithstanding some of the mixed signals that the Fed was sending out. But the examiners, if you look at the reports that were done, both the, I think Beaumont is doing one inverted one. The reports the supervisors just were not focused on the instability implications of interest rates going up that quickly. And that just kind of blows me away. So, I don’t, they haven’t they they’ve not integrated the two. I mean, no idea if it worked the way it should. Yeah, they were good. So I think actually the other regulators are more attuned to financial instability risk with the Fed because they’re not responsible for it. They’re not you know, they don’t have to take ownership of it at the Fed’s lowering rates like and say, hey, wait a minute. You know, what you’re doing is going to, create some instability. Or what if they have to raise it because of inflation. So I don’t and I, you know, I just maybe I did a, a report on this, a little report on this for the center for Financial Stability.
Does the Fed need a separate Board? 00:18:31:20
And I think one thing we threw out was maybe if you really want to keep it in the Fed, create a separate board. You know, the Europeans who does create a separate supervisory board, the one responsible just for that, have some overlap between the members of both. So but you get them talking about the interplay of these two roles because it’s not worked so far.
The day the Fed stepped aside 00:18:50:15
The and this is a problem. During 2008 the Fed was lowering capital then. And they had authority to write mortgage lending standards for Non-Banks. They were the only agency that did. They just flat out refused to to write them. Even if we saw this abuse and bubbly activity, building in housing so they don’t have a good record, of examiners and regulators and, and I think what we’re doing now just doesn’t work.
SVB made its own trouble- but the Fed blew it, too 00:19:54:15
But, you know, I don’t look it was what Silicon Valley bank was a very, very poorly managed bank that’s on them. That’s not on the Fed. They needed to, you know and interest rates can be unpredictable. Long rates, which are impacted as much by markets as the Fed can be unpredictable. So you need to to manage that interest rate risk. You’ve got long dated securities. Your interest rate is risk is greater. You need to hedge against that which they just didn’t do. So no, I don’t I don’t have any sympathy for the Silicon Valley bank, management at all. That notwithstanding, I think that the most remarkable thing about that was that, that the supervisors that a lack of a sense of urgency on the part of the Fed’s own supervisors about this risk when, you know, this was a prime example of the intersection of financial instability with monetary policy.
Bogus overregulation argument 00:21:20:24
Yeah. Well, so this is not because banks overregulated. This market has exploded, frankly, because banks that’s financing it. So again, this gets back to the capital standard. So this idea that the capital standards are so tough on the banks that the private firms have to do this lending. Well, the private funds are much less levered than the banks. Banks operate with very high levels of leverage. So the banks non-risk weighted or risk weighted, the banks are more levered than the private fund. So that idea is just not true. What is going on is that under the capital rules. And this was the same problem we had in the lead up to the subprime crisis. Banks can use a lot more leverage.
Risky business 00:22:05:13
Their risk based rules are a lot lower, and they can maximize the return on equity. If they lend to an intermediary, who then in turn leads to that really risky borrower. And then this intermediary gives them all this over collateralization and that was their common subprime, too. So they get a really low risk way if they make a loan directly to these risky companies, and private credit lends to risky companies, that’s their business model.
Evasive maneuvers still bring home risk 00:22:31:05
These are highly leveraged, mainly PE portfolio companies, a lot of debt. If the bank lent to them directly. Yeah, there’d be a really high capital charge. There’s this. There should be. But that doesn’t mean that it’s okay to indirectly fund them through the intermediary. And it’s a very minimum you need, I think, punitive capital charges on these exposures to private credit. If, you know, the banks are going to keep lending to them, I accept that. But the capital requirements need to be higher because you’ve got several things going on with private credit no regulation, no transparency. The valuations of all that excess collateral they’re giving back comes from the private credit fund managers who, by the way, are side compensated based on what those valuations say.
Conflict from disinterest 00:23:22:16
And is there been a lot of studies that suggest these valuations are inflated. And you’re it’s a particular problem with insurance. We’re talking about banks. But a lot of private equity funds as you know they have private credit affiliates and they have life insurance affiliates. They’ve got their life insurance affiliates investing in their private credit funds. And well, is at arm’s length, isn’t that rife with conflicts? Well, yeah. But they said, well, we’ve got this third party reader that came in and said, these loans are fine. Well, those are those are small kind of perimeter players. Visit a study about a year ago that took a look at some of them and concluded, I think over 50% of the ratings were inflated. So I’m not, you know, really, you know, a comforter covered in by these ragers coming in.
The over-collateralization argument 00:24:04:22
So, so lack of lack of regulation, lack of opacity, riskiness of those credits, that questionable valuations of banks going to lend these funds. There should be very, very steep capital requirements that go with them, but instead they’re very they’re very weak because the theoretically they’re over collateralized with. And that was we all remember CDO. CDO scared. Yeah. They were they were over collateralized. They’re two right. There was a top of the food chain. All this work, all that subordinate stuff was going to go take losses before them. And then it all went bad. It just all went bad. And that was painful.
The inevitability of solvency & credit concerns 00:25:34:17
With a lot of, a lot of tender loving care from the government. Yeah. So I think, I don’t think it’s possible to tease out liquidity from capital. A bank will get liquidity problems. Really. Any money, any company will get liquidity problems when they’re the market perceives they’re at risk of insolvency. Right. So when that happens everyone tries to get their money out before the bank goes.
Flirting with danger is dangerous 00:25:58:10
Yeah. So I don’t I think it’s, it’s really hard and somewhat misleading to try to and I know a lot of troubled banks say this. Well it was just a liquidity problem. It wasn’t a capital problem. Well, you’re having a liquidity problem because you were undercapitalized in the market, knew that you were you were you were bording on insolvency.
Citibank: land of many second chances 00:26:16:16
So we gave Citigroup a lot of bailouts. And, you know, monetary policy, was, accommodative for a decade after the crisis so that everybody that inflated everybody’s financial assets while the banks were helped by that, including Citigroup, we the government kind of winked and nodded and said, well, we’re not going to let them go down. Well, obviously, you know, because, you know, and I was out there suggesting that maybe we should try to break them up, because I didn’t think they, you know, they had a lot of problems.
…and back on the block 00:26:46:23
It was going to take a lot of time to get out of them, without the government’s protracted help. But, you know, the market like this, the market was willing to invest in them because they didn’t feel they were too big to fail. So, yeah, I mean, after, you know, 16 to 18 years and they’re finally making it back. They’ve been laggards for years. It’s only recently with Jane Fraser that you’ve seen a bit of a pop in their share price, an improvement in their in their earnings. And to her credit, I think it’s ironic that what she’s doing is a lot of what we suggested back in 2000. It got rid of the the international retail, you know, focuses on its international payments business.
Not a retail bank without a retail deposit base 00:27:25:23
Should you know you’re not you’re not a retail banker. You don’t have a deposit base. You know, there are a lot there are a lot of things you don’t do well. You have a few things you do too well, so focus on that. So I think trimming it down, streamlining it, simplifying it, which is what she’s finally doing, wouldn’t, you know, takes a woman is is, you know, is is getting it back on its feet. But how long did it take? And it’s been lumbering along for years. And I just still think that if back and well, when things was things had settled down in 2009 and 2010, we had broken it up, sold us assets to healthier, better managed banks, that that would have revived economic activity much better than just kind of propping this, you know, essentially zombie for several years.
City should have been broken up 00:28:12:04
So, I still think it was it was the right decision. I’m happy for Citigroup now. I’m happy for Citigroup. Shareholders are finally seeing some improvement. I’m very happy for Jane Fraser. I congratulate her on what she’s doing. And she’s making the tough decisions that that should have been made beforehand. But I still think it would have been better for the economy and frankly, probably ultimately better for the, the stakeholders in city if they’ve been broken up, and I think they were worth more, by, you know, just getting rid of the bad stuff and, and selling off the good stuff to more competent banks.
Shiela Bair author 00:29:07:07
Yeah well I used to have one here. So yeah it’s called bull by the horns. Yeah. It’s around here someplace. It’s called bull by the horns. It was my memoir, The Crisis, I think it was Simon and Schuster came out in 2012. It did very well. It was a New York Times…. well, Wall Street Journal post, a lot of bestseller lists for several weeks.
First book: “Bull by the Horns”- for specialists 00:29:25:01
So I was very pleased with, with the reception to it. And, yeah, I think it’s a good read for anybody interested in business or banking. Is, I do get into some detail, so it’s not I tried to write it for general audience, and I think it’s I break it down. So it’s understandable. But it is, you know, I think it’s a particular interest to people are interested in finance who specialize in finance.
Bullies of Wall Street 00:29:47:13
I wrote, a year later, I actually wrote a book for teenagers called Bullies of Wall Street. That was kind of the teenage version of what happened during the crisis, and that’s full of vignettes and true stories of people I anonymized, the characters obviously, of how, you know, Main Street was impacted. So, yeah, but that was, I was very pleased that how that book sold and its reception and, I’ve been writing this book since.
Ten books 00:30:37:04
So there are eight, elementary school books. And with that one (How Not to Lose One Million Dollars) now two teenage books. So ten children’s books.
How to build wealth- 00:31:06:09
Yeah, well, the the big thing I’m trying to get a call, get get across is to not the way to build wealth is to not lose money. Because so many people, especially young people, they’re reaching for the stars. They want to get rich, you know, they. Yeah, let’s go trade some stocks or invest in crypto or whatever. Gamble or worse. Don’t pay enough attention to simple budgeting and kind of the nuts and bolts. And they lose money unnecessarily and they do that. It’s not only cash out of their pocket into the pocket of a… some gambling casino or credit card company because they’re running balances or whatever. It’s money that they could invest and get generate compounding returns for decades because they’re so young, they’ve got 50 years ahead of them, probably before they’re going to tap into their retirement savings.
The ‘miracle’ of compounding 00:31:54:10
So that’s really compounding an opportunity cost are two key concepts I, I emphasize, but I just break, you know, every chapter. Banking, credit card, student loans, car loans, home loans, renting, health insurance, taxes, every financial challenge that they will confront as they become more financially independent. I include a chapter with some really easy. I call them helpful for helpful hacks at the end of each chapter.
Keep it simple 00:32:23:20
Very easy to understand. You know, another overarching theme is just keep it simple, right? Only have one credit card, only have one bank account. Don’t you know you try to do all this fancy stuff and it’s Mark. It’s marketed to kids, right? You know, here’s all these fancy rewards or this and that. For how many credit cards are they? Keep it simple. And then don’t make mistakes. And be wary when somebody offers a financial transaction to you. Be worry. Ask questions. Only. Deal with regulated entities like FDIC insured banks or registered broker dealers that the SEC and and avoid scams.
Sheila C. Bair
Author, Corporate Director & Former Chair, FDIC
Sheila Bair has had a long and distinguished career in government, academia, and finance. Twice named by Forbes Magazine as the second most powerful woman in the world, she is perhaps best known as Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from 2006 to 2011, when she steered the agency through the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. For her efforts to protect bank depositors and homeowners during the crisis, she received the Kennedy Library’s Profiles In Courage Award, and was named the “little guy’s protector in chief“ by Time Magazine.
A former finance professor and college president, Ms. Bair has been nationally recognized for her innovative initiatives to make college more accessible and affordable. She is a frequent commentator and op-ed contributor on financial regulation and the student debt crisis, as well as author of the NY Times Best Seller, Bull by the Horns, her 2012 memoir of the financial crisis. She is also author of Albert Whitman’s Money Tales series for young people. https://www.amazon.com/author/sheilabair
Ms. Bair currently serves on the board of Bunge Ltd, as Deputy Chair and Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominations Committee, and Lion Electric, as Chair of the Nominations and Governance Committee. She is also a member of the International Advisory Board to the Santander Group. Her past corporate boards include Fannie Mae, where she served as the first woman Chair; Thomson Reuters, where she chaired the Risk Committee; and Host Hotels. She is a founding director of the Volcker Alliance, established by former Federal Reserve Board Chair Paul Volcker to build trust in government. She continues her work on financial regulation and stability as the founding chair of the Systemic Risk Council, and as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Financial Stability. She serves as Senior Advisor to the Peter G. Peterson Foundation on its Student Debt Smarter initiative to promote transparency in the student debt system. She is also a trustee of the prestigious Economists for Peace and Security.
